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groups devoting their best energies to an unnecessary constitutional 
amendment suggests, at the very least, a defective set of priorities. 
PROTECfiNG THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE 
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL. By Norman L. Ro-
senberg.1 Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina 
Press. 1986. Pp. 369. $29.95. 
Dwight L. Teeter, Jr. 2 
When defamation suits are often Page One news-and when 
Attorney General Meese says the Supreme Court must return to the 
framers' intentions-this book is all too timely. Professor Norman 
Rosenberg set out to write an interpretive history of the law of libel. 
Along the way, however, he poked holes in "original understand-
ing" arguments so often hung on the first amendment. Without 
meaning to, he may have built a snappy little Meesetrap. 
This is an ambitious book. Covering the American experience 
with political libel-both criminal and civil-from colonial times to 
the 1980s is a tall order, especially in only 270 pages of text plus 100 
pages of detailed end-notes. Fortunately, Professor Rosenberg is a 
seasoned scholar who is equal to the task of generalizing without 
superficiality. This is not only a book about libel. It is rollicking 
good first amendment history, and it is a long-needed start toward a 
synthesis of the many secondary sources that he stirred together 
with his own research on political libel and on Michigan jurist-
scholar Thomas M. Cooley. Rosenberg may have devoted a dispro-
portionate amount of space to nineteenth-century Michigan libel 
law, but his book should encourage other state-by-state studies of 
political libel. Rosenberg is generous in crediting other scholars, 
has read widely, and seems to have no particular axes to grind. 
Equally important, he does not fall into the pit some revisionists dig 
for themselves, revising so ardently that their debunking, as has 
been said, often winds up as re-bunking. 
Rosenberg has jumped into the ongoing scholarly fray over se-
ditious libel3 touched off by Leonard W. Levy in his Legacy of Sup-
I. Professor of History, Macalester College. 
2. Professor, Dep't. of Mass Communication, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. 
3. Defamation law began by protecting the "best men" in England's feudal order, a 
society that, Rosenberg says, was "held together not by an absolutist state but primarily by 
personal bonds of honor and loyalty." Under the common law of England, truth was not a 
defense to a criminal prosecution for libel. From 1606 to 1641 the infamous Court of the Star 
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pression: Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History 
(1960), a fray revitalized by his 1985 revision of Legacy, entitled 
Emergence of a Free Press. Levy's 1960 work persuasively refuted 
Zechariah Chafee, Jr.'s claim that the first amendment was intended 
to erase the common law of seditious libel, "and to make further 
prosecutions for criticism of the government, without an incitement 
to law-breaking, forever impossible in the United States of 
America."4 Levy contended that seditious libel remained in force in 
this country long after the adoption of the first amendment. The 
1960 book asserted: "It is closer to the truth to say that the Revolu-
tion almost got rid of freedom of speech and press instead of the 
common law on the subject." 
Some critics responded that Levy should have looked more 
carefully at what was being published in the newspapers of Revolu-
tionary America. For example, Merrill Jensen while praising Leg-
acy of Suppression, wrote that Levy overestimated the power of law 
and undervalued the amount of press freedom in practice. Citing 
the feisty and ribald Philadelphia newspapers during the War for 
Independence, Jensen declared that they published "vast amounts 
of some of the bitterest, most dishonest (and seditious) writing in 
American political history. Despite the law, there was freedom of 
expression in fact."s 
In Emergence of a Free Press, Levy yielded a bit to some of his 
critics. After doing additional research in eighteenth century 
American newspapers, he conceded that he had become puzzled by 
Chamber held any political statement that had a "bad tendency" to lessen the public's regard 
for government authority to be the crime of "seditious libel." 
Defendants in civil suits were somewhat better off. To be sure, common law jurists held 
that truth could be libelous even in civil suits. But truth nevertheless worked as a defense, 
because if the defamation was true, the plaintiff was not entitled to an unblemished reputation 
and therefore could not recover damages. Eventually truth became an "absolute justifica-
tion" in civil libel actions, though not in criminal libel cases in England under Lord Camp-
bell's Act of 1743. 
Strands from the development of libel law in England are easily followed to the Ameri-
can colonies and through much of the nineteenth century. "Zengerian principles" and 
"Blackstonian libel doctrines" need to be explained here. In the 1735 common-law seditious 
libel trial of New York printer John Peter Zenger, the jury-following the English system-
was supposed to have a minor role. It was to decide only whether the defendant had "pub-
lished" the libel. The judge would decide whether the writings complained of were criminal. 
But Zenger's canny old Philadelphia lawyer, Andrew Hamilton, adroitly urged the jury to a 
broader role, and the jury defiantly rendered a general verdict in favor of Zenger. 
"Zengerian principles," as Rosenberg calls them, amounted to permitting truth as a de-
fense and also allowing jurors to determine "the law of the case," not merely the fact of 
publication. In contrast, Sir William Blackstone, whose Commentaries on the Law of Eng-
land first appeared in 1765, would not allow truth as a defense to criminal libel. His concept 
of free speech entailed only an absence of prior restraints. 
4. Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (1941). 
5. Jensen, Book Review, 75 HARV. L. REV. 456 (1961). 
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the paradox of nearly unfettered press practices in a system having 
heavy legal fetters. Newspaper practices aside, Levy reaffirmed his 
belief that Sir William Blackstone's view of seditious libel held sway 
in America throughout the eighteenth century. 
Rosenberg, on the other hand, attaches more importance to 
eighteenth century locutions about the proper role of the press than 
did Levy. Some formulations, Levy contended, were too limited 
and too qualified to be called a theory of free expression. Rosen-
berg, however, sees an intellectual foundation for a right to criticize 
government in the "Moderate Whig" theory of a free press. He 
views Andrew Bradford of Philadelphia's American Weekly Mer-
cury as an articulate voice for this "country" or "Moderate Whig" 
view during the Zenger trial of 1735. According to Rosenberg, 
Bradford rejected 
. . . the notion that all political criticism carried a dangerous tendency. Bradford 
leaned, instead, toward the country view that meaningful expression included "a 
Liberty of detecting the wicked and destructive Measures of certain Politicians ... 
of attacking Wickedness in high Places, of disentangling the intricate Folds of a 
wicked and corrupt Administration, and pleading freely for a Redress of 
Grievances. 
Rosenberg found a variety of attitudes toward criticism of gov-
ernment in the American colonies, in Revolutionary America, and 
well into the nineteenth century.6 Eighteenth century views, for ex-
ample, included the printers' frequent (if self-serving) statements 
6. Although it is now fashionable for managers of "the press" of the 1980s to bemoan 
the high cost of litigation and a number of exorbitant (often soon-to-be reduced) libel ver-
dicts, proliferation of civil libel suits is nothing new. Early in the nineteenth century, for 
example, civil libel suits were seen as an effective alternative to seditious/criminal libel prose-
cutions. In that century's first decade, James Cheetham of the American Citizen was sued for 
libel thirteen times in two years. 
Over time, public officials turned away from the criminal libel-which often generated 
troublesome adverse publicity-and began using civil libel as a weapon against dissent. After 
all, as Rosenberg observed, the Federalists' use of the Sedition Act of 1798 "gained the Jeffer-
sonians much more in campaign ammunition than it ever cost them in editorial firepower." 
And in any case, the Jeffersonians' libertarian credentials were by no means spotless. 
This may be seen in the framed criminal libel case against Federalist Harry Croswell. 
He republished James Callender's claim that Callender had been paid by Jefferson to slander 
Washington. This case brought forth Alexander Hamilton as Croswell's attorney, defending 
against the prosecution brought by Jeffersonian Republicans. 
Hamilton, who as Secretary of Treasury in the Washington Administration advocated 
several libel prosecutions, was thus in an ironic and unfamiliar position. Alexander Hamil-
ton's arguments, however, fell short of those advanced by Zenger's lawyer, Andrew Hamilton 
(no relation). Alexander Hamilton backed away from the full Zengerian approach of using 
truth as a complete defense. Instead, truth should be a defense only when published-a 
marvelous weasel phrase-"for good motives and justifiable ends." Hamilton, however, did 
follow the Zengerian idea of the role of a jury: allow it to return a general verdict of guilty or 
innocent. 
The prosecution of Croswell failed when New York's Supreme Court split along party 
lines and could not reach a decision. Understandably, the case became a rallying point for 
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about offering a free forum ("Open to All Parties, But Influenced by 
None"), plus writers who made statements 
... of support for Zengerian principles, of endorsement of Orthodox Whig doc-
trines, and of Cato-like sentiments from opposition politicians, and of nearly univer-
sal condemnations of "licentiousness"-but certainly it should be obvious that no 
single view, and certainly not the Blackstonian one as Leonard Levy claimed, domi-
nated colonial discussion about free expression." 
Even if there was agreement that public officials could put legal 
limits on discussion of public matters, Rosenberg contends, there 
was sharp disagreement over what the legal limits were. 1 In 1782, 
in the first issue of Philadelphia's Independent Gazetteer; Or, the 
Chronicle of Freedom, the combative soldier-duelist-journalist Elea-
zer Oswald conceded that freedom of the press had no fixed, agreed-
upon definition. Oswald wrote that "the Liberty of the Press, so 
highly extolled by all Persons, has not been clearly defined by any. 
Some contend for unbounded liberty, and that this being equally 
allowed on all sides, Truth and Justice having fair Play, would nec-
essarily over-power their Opposition, and finally prevail."s 
Levy, Rosenberg said, was " ... perfectly correct in maintain-
ing that 'few, if any, legal writers in Revolutionary America rejected 
the "core" of seditious libel, the notion that government may be 
criminally assaulted by mere words.' " But Rosenberg also con-
cluded that the Revolutionary generation "was not united in a 
Federalist complaints about Jeffersonian hypocrisies. As Federalist Thomas Green Fes-
sendon, a Vermont newspaper editor and lawyer, wrote in 1805: 
I'll search in Democratic annals 
Elicit truth from dirty channels 
Describe low knaves in high condition 
Though speaking truth be deem'd sedition." 
7. Rosenberg might have included more examples of newspaper printers touting vir-
tues and benefits of a "free press." Consider some wretched poetry, attributed to Benjamin 
Franklin and published by Francis Bailey of Philadelphia's Freeman's Journal in 1781: 
WHILE free from force the Press remains; 
Virtue and freedom chear (sic) our plains, 
And learning largesses bestows, 
And keeps unlicensed open house 
This Nurse of Arts, and Freedom's Fence, 
To chain, is treason against sense, 
And Liberty, thy thousand tongues 
None silence who design no wrong; 
For those that use the gag's restraint, 
First rob, before they stop complaint. 
(Philadelphia) Freeman's Journal, April 25, 1781. 
8. (Philadelphia) Independent Gazetteer; Or the Chronicle of Freedom, April 13, 
1782. Oswald was echoing John Milton's 1644 Areopagiticia: "And though all the winds of 
doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by 
licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever 
knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?" J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICIA 59 
(W. Haller ed. 1927). 
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Blackstonian consensus, and neither, as Leonard Levy's Legacy of 
Suppression maintained, were opposition ideas simply 'in the air.'" 
Instead, Rosenberg argues that in the years from 1781 to 1787, 
many Americans were rejecting Blackstone's assertion that would 
make criticism of government-virtually any criticism-a crime. 
What then of "the intent of the Framers," so recently touted 
by Attorney General Meese,9 when the first amendment is con-
cerned? In Rosenberg's view, the "original understanding" does 
not exist, or, at any rate, cannot be known. The adoption of the 
first amendment and the Bill of Rights-"designed to calm fears of 
the Antifederalists" -left little evidence of what was intended by 
"freedom of speech, or of the press." 
The paucity of evidence on the drafting of the First Amendment itself, together 
with the abundance of evidence attesting to the absence of precise agreement on 
state libel laws, points to one conclusion: even the relatively small group of people 
who framed and ratified the First Amendment shared no common original under-
standing about its precise meaning or implication for the future. 
Unlike Levy and many other scholars, Rosenberg does not 
limit his attention to early American history. As journalism profes-
sor and historian Margaret A. Blanchard observed in 1982, it is not 
easy to trace the development of efforts to put meaning into the 
phrase "freedom of the press." She noted that most first amend-
ment history-including that by renowned scholars like Thomas I. 
Emerson and Zechariah Chafee-dealt with the eighteenth century 
(the trial of John Peter Zenger in the 1730s, the ratification of the 
first amendment, and the bleak days of the Alien and Sedition Acts 
of 1798), and then skipped over the nineteenth century to World 
War I (the Espionage Act of 1917 and its 1918 Sedition amend-
ment) and the two thousand cases generated in that time of 
profound hysteria.w Professor Rosenberg has provided a useful, if 
partial, survey of nineteenth century political libel cases and has 
helped to begin "filling the void" in a century's worth of needed first 
amendment scholarship. 
Especially valuable is his discussion of the Ohio jurist and 
political theorist, Frederick Grimke. Grimke put great reliance on 
the press: " 'If the press were extinguished, the great principle on 
which representative government hinges, the responsibility of public 
agents to the people,' would be largely lost." Grimke argued that 
9. See Floyd Abrams, "Mr. Meese Caricatures the Constitution," The New York 
Times, July 25, 1986 at 23; Stuart Taylor, Jr., "Administration Trolling for Constitutional 
Debate," The New York Times, Oct. 28, 1985, Sec. F, at 10. 
10. Blanchard, "Filling the Void." Speech and Press in State Courts Prior to Gitlow, in 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED 14-16 (B. Chamberlin & C. Brown eds. 1982). 
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the most scurrilous political diatribes in newspapers would be un-
likely to harm the republic. From his mid-nineteenth century van-
tage point, he relished the clashes of partisan newspapers as healthy 
and inevitably leading to social and political stability. 
Protecting the Best Men is not as strong in its discussion of the 
twentieth century. Libel cases of the last decade or two are dis-
cussed almost perfunctorily. Further, Rosenberg may not be criti-
cal enough of the legal establishment to suit some observers. He 
suggests that the proliferation of libel suits has stemmed from more 
journalists producing more column inches about events of greater 
public interest. Now there are also more lawyers in the U.S.-
about 650,000, or two-thirds of the world's supply. Separate 
courses in media law are offered in many law schools-adding 
mightily to the several lectures that used to be devoted to defama-
tion and invasion of privacy in torts courses roughly twenty years 
ago--so that the frequency of lawsuits against the media in the 
1980s is not surprising. (The old saying goes, put one lawyer in a 
town; that lawyer will starve. Put two in a town, they will both get 
rich.) 
Beyond Professor Rosenberg's splendid beginning, there is 
much work to be done, much reinterpretation. As he observes: 
Indeed, the prominent libel battles of the mid-1980's-General Ariel Sharon versus 
Time, Inc., William Tavoulareas versus Washington Post Co., and General William 
Westmoreland versus CBS--assumed the character of trench warfare involving elite 
members of the modern corporate-military order. If, as some observers insist, late 
twentieth-century politics revolve around a new kind of "feudalism," might not 
many modern liberal trials be seen as contemporary versions of baronial conflict 
among the self-styled best men? 
TAKINGS. By Richard A. Epstein.' Cambridge, Ma.: 
Harvard University Press. 1985. Pp. xi, 362. 
Edward Foster2 
Public law, argues Professor Richard Epstein, should be a co-
herent and consistent extension of the individual rights that are se-
cured by private law. Although public law covers relationships 
between groups, these must be translatable into statements about 
individuals; public law should not deny rights that the government 
is pledged to protect in private law. Takings argues that the origi-
I. James Parker Hall Professor of Law, University of Chicago. 
2. Professor of Economics, University of Minnesota. 
